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Abstract
An essential issue in the construction of new or in the replacement of the old analogue
automation applications in nuclear power plants is the reliability of computer-based
systems, and especially the question of how to assess their reliability. The reliability issue
is particularly important when the system under assessment is considered as a safety-
critical system, such as the reactor protection system. To build sufficient confidence on the
reliability of computer-based systems appropriate reliability assessment methods should
be developed and applied. The assessment methods should provide useful and plausible
reliability estimates, while taking the special characteristics of the reliability assessment
of computer-based systems into consideration.
The Bayesian inference has proved to be an efficient methodology in the reliability assess-
ment of computer-based automation applications. Practical implementation of Bayesian
inference, Bayesian networks, allow the combination of the different safety arguments
concerning the system and its development process to a unified reliability estimate.
Bayesian networks are also a convenient way to communicate on the safety argumenta-
tion between various participants of systems design and implementation as well as be-
tween the participants in the licensing processes of computer-based automation systems.
This study is a part of the research project “Programmable Automation System Safety
Integrity assessment (PASSI)”, belonging to the Finnish Nuclear Safety Research Pro-
gramme (FINNUS, 1999–2002). The project aimed to provide support for the authorities
and utilities in the licensing problems of computer-based automation systems. Particular
objective of the project was to acquire, develop and test new and more cost-effective
methods and tools for the safety and reliability assessment, and to gather practical experi-
ence on their use in order to achieve a more streamlined licensing process for the compu-
ter-based automation systems.
The project is financed together by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK),
the Ministry of Trade and Industry (KTM) and the Technical Research Centre of Finland
(VTT).
HAAPANEN Pentti, HELMINEN Atte, PULKKINEN Urho (VTT Industrial Systems). Quantitative
reliability assessment in the safety case of computer-based automation systems. STUK-YTO-TR 202.
Helsinki 2004. 36 pp.
Keywords: safety case, reliability assessment, automation, computer-based system,
programmable systems, protection systems, nuclear reactor safety, Bayesian networks
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Tiivistelmä
Keskeinen kysymys ydinvoimalaitosten uusien ohjelmoitavien järjestelmien rakentami-
sessa tai vanhojen analogisten järjestelmien uusinnoissa on näiden järjestelmien luotetta-
vuuden arviointi. Erityisen tärkeä tämä kysymys on turvallisuuskriittisten, esim. reakto-
rin suojausjärjestelmien osalta. Riittävän uskottavuuden saavuttamiseen tähtääviä
luotettavuusarviointimenetelmiä tulee näin ollen kehittää ja soveltaa. Arviointimenetel-
mien tulee tuottaa käyttökelpoisia ja uskottavia luotettavuusarvioita ottaen huomioon
ohjelmoitavien järjestelmien erityispiirteet.
Bayesilainen päättely on osoittautunut tehokkaaksi menetelmäksi ohjelmoitavien auto-
maatiojärjestelmien luotettavuuden arvioinnissa. Bayesilaiseen päättelyyn perustuvien
Bayes-verkkojen avulla voidaan yhdistää erilainen järjestelmää ja sen kehitysprosessia
koskeva turvallisuusargumentaatio yhtenäiseksi luotettavuusarvioksi. Menetelmä toimii
myös tehokkaana argumentoinnin välineenä ohjelmoitavien järjestelmien suunnittelun,
toteuttamisen ja lisensiointiprosessien eri osapuolien välillä.
Tutkimus on osa Suomen kansalliseen ydinturvallisuustutkimusohjelmaan (FINNUS
1999–2002) kuuluvaa ”Ohjelmoitavan automaation turvallisuuden arviointi (PASSI)”-
projektia. Projektin yleisenä tavoitteena on ollut tukea viranomaista ja voimayhtiöitä
ohjelmoitavien automaatiojärjestelmien lisensointitehtävissä. Erityisesti on pyritty
hankkimaan, kehittämään ja kokeilemaan uusia kustannustehokkaita menetelmiä ja
työkaluja turvallisuuden ja luotettavuuden arviointiin, sekä keräämään käytännön
kokemuksia menetelmien soveltamisesta ohjelmoitavien järjestelmien lisensiointiproses-
sin kehittämistä varten.
Projektia ovat rahoittaneet yhdessä Säteilyturvakeskus (STUK), Kauppa- ja teollisuusmi-
nisteriö (KTM) ja Valtion teknillinen tutkimuskeskus (VTT).
HAAPANEN Pentti, HELMINEN Atte, PULKKINEN Urho (VTT Tuotteet ja tuotanto). Ohjelmoitavien
automaatiojärjestelmien kvantitatiivinen luotettavuusarviointi järjestelmien lupakäsittelyssä. STUK-
YTO-TR 202. Helsinki 2004. 36 s.
Avainsanat: turvallisuusanalyysi, luotettavuusanalyysi, automaatio, ohjelmoitavat järjestelmät,
tietokonepohjaiset järjestelmät, suojausjärjestelmät, reaktoriturvallisuus, Bayes-verkot
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1 IntroductionThe safe operation of a nuclear power plant re-
quires that the probability of accidents leading to
a large release of radioactivity is extremely low
[1]. That requirement means that the physical bar-
riers (fuel, cladding, primary pressure system and
the containment) preventing the release are kept
intact with a high probability. Present Finnish nu-
clear power plant Guide YVL 2.8 sets quantitative
probabilistic safety goals for a severe core damage
and for a large release of radioactivity [2]. In
present day non-passive plant concepts the safety
requires certain active safety functions that can be
started and carried through when needed with
high reliability.
The use of software in different functions has
increased rapidly and nowadays computer-based
systems have become an integral part of nearly
every engineering application. The additional
functionality provided by software has been imple-
mented also to the modern automation systems
and these systems have successfully been used for
example for the controlling of conventional ther-
mal power plants. Good experiences on the use of
computer-based automation systems and, on the
other hand, the technical and economical ageing of
the current automation systems in the existing
nuclear power plants is in favour of replacing the
systems with corresponding computer-based sys-
tems also in nuclear power plants.
For the demonstration of the fulfilment of the
above overall safety goals an estimate of the
reliability of the essential safety-critical automa-
tion applications is needed. This estimate cannot
be based entirely on deterministic criteria since
our present day level of knowledge would then
lead to over-conservative assumptions and unbal-
anced design solutions. Probabilistic and quantita-
tive criteria must therefore be included in the
reliability estimation of computer-based automa-
tion systems.One of the essential issues when replacing the
automation applications of nuclear power plants is
the reliability of computer-based systems, and
especially the question of how to assess the relia-
bility. The reliability issue is particularly impor-
tant when the system under assessment is consid-
ered as a safety-critical system such as the reactor
protection system. To build sufficient confidence
on the reliability of computer-based systems ap-
propriate reliability assessment methods should
be developed and applied. The assessment meth-
ods should provide useful and plausible reliability
estimates, while taking the special characteristics
of the reliability assessment of computer-based
systems into consideration.
A problem causing extra work in the reliability
assessment of computer-based safety-critical sys-
tems has at least the following characteristics.
First, strict reliability goals are set for the auto-
mation systems responsible for the safety func-
tions of nuclear power plants and to demonstrate
the achievement of these goals the systems should
be well built and thoroughly tested. Second, the
discontinuous behaviour of discrete logic in com-
puter-based systems has the effect that to be sure
on the functionality of the system in all occasions
the system should be tested with all possible
inputs. However, full testing of a system is usually
not feasible because of the large number of possi-
ble inputs even for a relatively simple system and,
therefore, for a more complicated computer-based
system a thorough testing would require an unac-
ceptable amount of time and effort. One proposal
to overcome the problem is to compensate the
shortage of testing with reliability related evi-
dence from other sources closely involved with
computer-based systems.
Research on reliability of computer-based sys-
tems has been carried out for several years in
Finnish national research programs on nuclear7
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 2safety. In the Programmable automation systems
in nuclear power plants (OHA) -project (1995–
1998) e.g. the statistical testing methods and oper-
ational profiles and diversity requirements were
studied and a reference model for safety case
processes was developed for computer-based sys-
tems. Acquisition, development and testing of new
and more cost-effective reliability and safety as-
sessment methods for the computer-based systems
have been the main objectives of the Programma-
ble automation system safety integrity assess-
ment (PASSI) -project belonging to the Finnish
research programme on nuclear power plant safe-
ty (FINNUS) -programme (1999–2002). The em-
phasis of PASSI-project has been on the applica-8tion of Bayesian inference in reliability assess-
ment and an experimental case study was per-
formed in the project. Description of the whole
research carried out in PASSI-project is given in
the final report of FINNUS-programme [3].
This report first describes the basic features of
the safety case for computer-based safety critical
automation systems. Following an illustration of
the reliability modelling of computer-based sys-
tems using Bayesian networks is given. Further
on the experimental application case study is
summarised. In the end of the report a discussion
on the gained experience and further research and
development needs is given.
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2 Safety case of computer-based systemsA safety related system must have a safety case;
this is explicitly required by licensing regulations
in a wide range of industries and equivalent re-
quirements are given in many standards such as
IEC 61508 [4]. The safety case should:
• demonstrate an adequate level of safety
• ensure safety is maintained throughout the
lifetime of the system
• minimise project risk
Adelard [5] defines a safety case as:
A document body of evidence that provides a
demonstrable and valid argument that a sys-
tem is adequately safe for a given application
and environment over its lifetime.
In the following some important aspects of the
safety case are shortly discussed.
2.1 Acceptance criteria
Two complementary safety analyses have general-
ly been used in the safety evaluation of nuclear
installations. The different analyses are named as
deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis.
The deterministic approach is fully based on rules
and guides established by rulemaking or regulato-
ry organisations. In a report by De Gelder [6] the
deterministic approach is illustrated with follow-
ing major steps:
• identification and categorisation of events con-
sidered in the design basis of the installation
under analysis;
• analysis of enveloping scenarios;
• evaluation of the consequences verification that
acceptance criteria are met.
In probabilistic approach the analysis is taken be-
yond the design basis of the installation, and pos-
sible accident scenarios are evaluated with the ex-
tensive use of probability calculus. The major stepsin the probabilistic safety analysis are following
[6]:
• identification of the initiating events and the
plant operational states to be considered;
• analysis of the possible accident scenarios, by
means of event trees;
• reliability analysis, by means of fault trees, of
the system considered in the fault trees;
• collection of probabilistic data (failure
probabilities, unavailability for test and
maintenance, initiating event frequencies)
• human error analysis;
• accident sequence quantification, resulting in a
frequency for each core melt sequence;
• interpretation of the results (including
sensitivity and importance analysis)
After all preventive and mitigating measures con-
sidered for the design of an installation using the
deterministic safety analysis, the installation still
represent some residual risk. This risk is consid-
ered in the probabilistic safety analysis.
In the case of computer-based automation sys-
tems the residual risk is particularly problematic.
As mentioned already in the introduction to be
sure on the functionality of the system in all
occasions the system should be tested with all
possible inputs in all internal system states. In
practice this is usually not feasible because of the
large number of possible inputs and system states
even for a relatively simple system.
Given the special characteristics of computer-
based systems it is reasonable to consider three
types of acceptance criteria for the safety critical
computer-based automation systems. The criteria
can broadly be classified in three principal catego-
ries:
• deterministic,
• qualitative, and
• probabilistic.9
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Figure 1. Safety demonstration process (UK).
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Independent
confidence buildingA criterion is deterministic if its fulfilment can be
expressed as a two-valued (i.e. true–false) logical
expression. Even if it in practice may sometimes
be difficult, this evaluation can always be made.
Of the basic safety design principles the redun-
dancy is a typical example of a deterministic crite-
rion; a system/function realisation either includes
redundancy or does not. The same goes also for the
defence–in–depth safety principle. Separation/seg-
regation is usually also considered to be a deter-
ministic criterion, but in practice these also in-
clude some probabilistic features (e.g. is the sepa-
ration of redundancies into different fire depart-
ments efficient against all plausible fire situa-
tions). Many single requirements of standards and
guidelines are of deterministic nature, e.g. the re-
quirement that interrupts shall not be used in the
software of a safety critical programmable system.
A criterion is qualitative if the fulfilment can
only be somehow graded on a qualitative scale.
The adherence to standards and guidelines in
general is of this type. Although the fulfilment of
many of the single requirements, as seen before,
can be evaluated exactly there still remains many
that can only be assessed on a qualitative scale
(e.g. very low, low, medium, high, very high) and
usually requires some kind of expert judgement.
A criterion is probabilistic if the fulfilment can
only be expressed as a probability or probability
distribution. Of the basic safety design principles
the diversity may at first sight seem to be a
deterministic criteria; the system/function either
includes diverse features or does not. As a safety
design principle the diversity, however, does not
have any absolute value, but introducing diverse
features in a system is aimed for diverse failure
behaviour of the system. There is some evidence,
especially for computer-based systems that di-
verse redundant channels can fail simultaneously
and only probabilistic assessment of their common
cause failure propensity is possible.
For the clearness and unambiguity of the safe-
ty case a well-defined set of deterministic accept-
ance criteria would be desirable. Concerning the
computer-based safety systems our present level
of knowledge about the relation between the safe-
ty of the system and the deterministic features of
the system and its design process is still some-
what inadequate. Strictly deterministic criteria
would, therefore easily lead to unbalanced design10solutions and wasteful resource allocation in the
design and licensing of these systems. Qualitative
and probabilistic acceptance criteria are therefore
needed.
On the other hand, one should also bear in
mind that the safety itself is a probabilistic con-
cept. Safety is defined by nature as the freedom
from unacceptable risk and risk is defined as the
combination of the probability of occurrence of
harm and the severity of the harm. The newly
reformed Finnish safety regulation does not set
any more direct reliability requirements on single
safety functions, but only for the frequency of
severe reactor accidents and large radioactive re-
lease. Plant design solutions then lead to corre-
sponding reliability requirements for those plant
functions credited in plant probabilistic safety
analyses.
2.2 Safety evidence
The licensing process is defined as a set of interre-
lated activities, whose objective is to collect evi-
dence supporting the safety claims about the sys-
tem to be licensed, and based on this evidence to
assess, ideally numerically, the achieved reliability
or safety of the system. Figure 1 gives an example
of a safety demonstration process for a computer-
based safety automation system in United King-
dom. [7]
The quality evidence about the design process
consists e.g. of adherence to well-established set of
standards and guidelines, use of qualified design,
verification and validation tools, skilled personnel,
high quality project management and quality con-
trol/quality assurance program, documentation
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 2etc. This evidence shall be raised in parallel with
the proceeding the design process itself. It will
evolve and become more detailed and accurate
when the system design shapes up. This mostly
qualitative evidence is then combined during the
licensing process with the high quality product
evidence gained through tests, analyses and oper-
ational experience.
Presently the safety systems are in most cases
implemented on a pre-qualified, or certified, auto-
mation system platform. In this case the design
process is divided in two completely separate
phases, namely:
• platform design process (providing the plat-
form hw/sw-components and tools for the appli-
cation design and V&V activities)
• application design process (providing the appli-
cation)
The acceptance evidence can accordingly be divid-
ed to process and product evidences concerning
the platform and the application as shown in Fig-
ure 2.
The platform approach can provide advantages
both in costs and safety:Figure 2. Safety evidences for a platform application safet
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What evidence we have about the
platform?
? Artifacts from the lifecycle
? Requirements, different kind of
analysis, design documentation,
source codes, test reports...
? 3rd. party qualification
? Certificates, requirements and results
? Version histories and operational
experiences
? etc...
What evidence we have about the
platform development process?
? Quality documents of the platform
development process
? V&V-reports, 3rd. party
assessments etc..
? Resources
? Personnel, education...
? Configuration mgmt
? Tools used and tool quality
? etc...• more effort can be put in the platform design
process when development costs can be divided
between a large amount of applications; this
will increase the process and product quality,
• operating experience from different applica-
tions, if properly collected and used for product
improvements, can improve the product quali-
ty,
• platform evidence is the same for each individ-
ual application making a type acceptance proc-
ess possible and reducing the costs of the
application licensing process,
• individual application may, however, require
some adjustments for the platform components
or tools, and make project specific evaluation of
these necessary, and
• platform evidence, of course, can not alone
guarantee the safety of the application, but
other pieces of evidence presented in fig. 2 are
needed as well.
A central issue in the licensing process is the com-
bination of the different pieces of evidence men-
tioned above to a safety and reliability estimate of
the application. Actually inference from statistical11
y system.
What evidence we have about the
application?
? Artifacts from the lifecycle
? Requirements, different kind of
analysis, design documentation,
source codes, test reports...
? etc...
APPLICATION
What evidence we have about the
application development process?
? Quality documents of the application
development process
? V&V-reports, 3rd. party
assessments etc..
? Resources
? Personnel, education...
? Configuration mgmt
? Tools used and tool quality
? etc...
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 2testing is the only sound method available for esti-
mating software reliability. However, if one ignores
evidence other than testing, e.g., evidence from
the track record of the developer, or from the qual-
ity of the development process, the results are go-
ing to be so conservative that they are often felt to
be useless for decision-making. Bayesian inference
is the main mathematical tool for taking into ac-
count diverse knowledge. Closer introduction to
Bayesian inference and Bayesian networks is giv-
en later in the text.
2.3 Failures and defences
Understanding the failure mechanisms in compu-
ter-based systems and the knowledge about the
defences against them is a necessity for the defini-
tion of the structure and contents of the safety
case. Figure 3 describes the basic failure mecha-
nisms in such a system.
Malfunction is a result of some fault in the
system. Faults are either inherent in the system, if
they can be attributed to deficiencies in the pro-
duction of the system, e.g. to errors in system
design or to flaws arising in the implementation/
manufacturing process, or they can be caused by
random hardware component failures. The faults
lead either to immediate malfunction or they can
stay latent in the system until a specific triggering
input leads to a conditional malfunction.
Hardware component failures may occur either
due to ageing (wear and tear, physical or chemical
effects) or due to some harmful external influenc-
es.
The influence of failures due to ageing on the
reliability of the system can be determined with
adequate certainty by means of usual reliability12
Figure 3. Failure mechanisms in a computer-based system
design
error
manufacturing
flaw
inherent
sw fault
ageing
external
influences
random
hw failure
inherent
hw fault
implementation
flaw
 production
deficienciesengineering methods. Due to the extensive opera-
tional experience available, the underlying fault
models and data are of high quality. Redundancy,
i.e. the provision of multiple parallel channels, is
the basic mean to protect the system functioning
against random component failures.
Failures due to external influences can occur in
all equipment exposed to such influences. Experi-
ence has shown the following to be the most
common external influences:
• climatic conditions (heat, moisture),
• mechanical impacts (e.g. earthquake),
• heat and/or smoke from fires, and
• electromagnetic fields.
The approach of creating physically separated
building sections or equipment trains ensures that
the maximum scope of impact of any such failure
is restricted to one building section/equipment
train. Due to the structural design and arrange-
ment of the plant buildings faults for example in
the nuclear steam supply system cannot affect the
central automation equipment. Further precau-
tions (e.g. selective fusing) may be taken to confine
the reflection of a failure to smaller, defined areas
within a building section or equipment train (e.g.
in a single electronic equipment cabinet). Protec-
tion against external impacts such as flooding,
lightning strikes and storms must be provided not
just in the form of local separation but also by
means of further structural design features for all
items of safety automation equipment (e.g. linking
the cabinets by optic fibres).
Malfunctions due to production deficiencies are
caused by faults that are inherent in the system.
Only duly qualified, individually shop-tested com-.
fault in
system
conditional
malfunction
immediate
malfunction
triggering
input
&
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 2ponents should be used in safety automation sys-
tems. Shop and system tests are performed to
verify that the equipment actually exhibits the
specified quality and design features. In particu-
lar, the system test verifies that equipment fulfils
its design requirements. But even the most inten-
sive testing cannot completely rule out the inher-
ent faults.
2.3.1 Hardware and software faults
It is a characteristic of faults due to production
deficiencies that they are present in the system at
all times. This implies that, given identical initial
conditions and triggering inputs, faults due to pro-
duction deficiencies will always cause malfunc-
tions in the same way. As presented in Figure 3
the product deficiencies are caused by implemen-
tation flaws, design errors and manufacturing
flaws in hardware and software. In the following, a
distinction between the characteristics of hard-
ware and software faults will be made.
Computer–based automation systems are made
up of only a few different types of hardware
modules that are used together with different
software for specific applications. The hardware is
used in time–sharing mode by numerous functions
implemented in the software, which access the
hardware in identical cycles. The engineering ef-
fort that goes into the hardware, and consequently
the potential for hardware faults, are considerably
lower than in the case of hardwired automation
systems. In particular, cyclic accessing of the hard-
ware makes it highly probable that faults due to
production deficiencies in computer–based auto-
mation systems will cause spontaneous malfunc-
tion or – if the faulty feature is not used – will not
cause any malfunction at all. It should be pointed
out that experience to date provides no evidence
that hardware faults due to production deficien-
cies in the instrumentation and control equipment
could cause this equipment to fail as a result of
circumstances arising in the power plant process.
Faults are particularly improbable in the light of
the fact that strictly cyclic processing of all pro-
grams used during normal operation, which is a
basic design requirement, and ensures that the
status of the instrumentation and control system
is independent of any challenges made to the
system. That is to say, there are no known mecha-
nisms that could lead to such a linked response.The reason for system failures, caused by soft-
ware, cannot be either in ageing or in wear and
tear of the software. Software can change only if
its properties are intentionally changed. The rea-
son of false behaviour is already in software when
it is being installed and software faults are intro-
duced into programs during the design process,
either by the designers or the tools used. Inherent
software fault is activated to cause the system
malfunction by some input signal combinations
with certain internal system states. Taking into
account that the internal state of the software is a
deterministic function of the input signal history,
or input trajectory, this actually means that the
unreliability of the software is determined by the
probability of the occurrence of the error activat-
ing signal trajectory i.e. the operation profile of
the system. Two identical computer-based systems
can have quite different reliabilities if they are
exposed to different operation profiles. This fact
e.g. makes it harder to utilise operational experi-
ence in the reliability assessment of computer-
based systems.
2.3.2 Types of software faults
Considering the development process of program-
mable automation systems, the importance of ear-
ly phases of the process is even more emphasised
as in ordinary software development. Here the
software implementation oriented phases are not
so problematic, as applications are automatically
built of quality controlled software components. Of
course, errors may also be created during applica-
tion building phases, but usually the tools are well
validated, via extensive use for instance, and this
possibility is often less likely than human errors
in earlier phases. In any case, the following types
of software faults in programmable automation
system can be distinguished:
• faults due to errors in the requirement specifi-
cation,
• faults due to errors in the functional specifica-
tion,
• faults due to errors in code generation.
Software faults due to errors in the requirement
specification applies to specified requirements
which are either inappropriate for the identifica-
tion of the incidents and accidents concerned or
which provide no suitable countermeasures for13
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 2control of these. Such errors cannot be avoided by
technical means, but a formalised design process,
and in particular effective verification and valida-
tion methods make it much more probable that
such errors will be discovered. A software engi-
neering process, which applies interpretable speci-
fication documents, thus supporting validation
with the aid of a proven plant simulator makes for
a considerable improvement in quality by compar-
ison with design engineering for hardwired safety
systems.
A technique, which is also of major importance
in counteracting the effects of errors in the re-
quirements specification derived from the process
design, is diversity. The means to implement di-
versity on the one hand in the form of diverse
criteria for identification of an accident malfunc-
tion with associated diverse countermeasures, and
on the other hand in a defence–in–depth ap-
proach. Suitably structured automation systems
and appropriate distribution of functions to differ-
ent equipment can help to ensure that diversity in
the system requirements is also implemented in
the form of diverse software and thus constitutes
an effective means of accommodating software
faults originating in other phases of development.
Software faults due to errors in the functional
specification are the result of incorrect translation
of the system requirements into the automation
systems functional specification. Besides the need
to accommodate the effects of such faults, the use
of quality–assured measures in the translation of
the system requirements into the functional speci-
fication in order to avoid such faults in the first
place is of particular importance.
Software faults due to errors in code generation
are the result of incorrect translation of the formal
functional specification into the object code for the
digital computer. In principle, such errors can
have very different effects. The measures that can
be taken to avoid and to accommodate them are
just as varied as the effects of such errors. The key
to avoiding such failures lies in the method of
automatic code generation and in the capacities
and quality of the tools used. For this reason, code
generation for computer–based automation sys-
tems should always be performed with the aid of
tried and tested tools. The quality of these tools
will be enhanced as the user base expands, thanks
to the produced improvement resulting from
large–scale experience feedback.142.3.3 Common cause failures
Software faults are design faults introduced to the
software during the design and implementation
process. In a multi–channel redundant system
having identical software in each channel also the
possible residual faults are present in all chan-
nels. If an input sequence (signal trajectory) trig-
gering erroneous response is fed to all channels
they may fail simultaneously. The residual soft-
ware faults can thus be a source of common cause
failures (CCF’s) of a redundant programmable sys-
tem.
There is also some evidence that even channels
having diverse software may contain common de-
sign faults that cause them to fail simultaneously.
Software CCF potential may exist between differ-
ent systems or between different channels in one
system e.g. when common software modules are
used. Other common features with CCF potential
include common architecture, algorithms, develop-
ment methods, tools, implementation methods,
staffing and management [8].
Deficiencies in software can be due to incorrect,
incomplete, inaccurate or misunderstood software
requirements and software specifications. Design
errors or software faults can be present in diverse
programs, due to common human factors such as
training, organisation, thinking processes and de-
sign approaches.
In summary, the experiments conducted on this
issue indicate that statistically correlated failures
result from the nature of the application, from
similarities in the difficulties experienced by indi-
vidual programmers, and from special cases in the
input space. The correlations seem to be related to
the fact that the programmers are all working on
the same problem and that humans do not make
mistakes in a random fashion.
There is no reason to expect that the use of
different development tools or methods, or any
other simple technique, will reduce significantly
the incidence of errors giving rise to correlated
failures in multiple-version software components.
All evidence points to the fact that independently
developed software that uses different program-
mers, programming languages, and algorithms but
computes the same function (satisfies the same
functional requirements) cannot be assumed to
fail in an independent fashion.
Also abnormal hardware failures, plant condi-
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Table I. Failure types and defences.
Fault types Random component faults Inherent design faults External events
Failure types Single failure Can lead to Common Cause Failures (CCF)
Defence Redundancy Diversity Separation/segregation
1oo2 sufficient for safety, but 
can cause inadvertent 
actuations. These lower the 
plant availability and can also 
act as initiating events for 
accident scenarios
2oo3 sufficient both for safety 
and availability but reduces to 
1oo2 when one train is failed/
under maintenance.
2oo4 manages all the previous 
if no common cause failures 
present
Proper selection of 
hardware, software and 
implementation diversity 
can protect the 
redundancies against 
common cause failures 
caused by inherent faults.
Functional diversity is 
considered a good 
defence against common 
cause failures in diverse 
redundancies.
Physical separation and 
geographical segregation 
protects the redundancies 
to fail due external events.
Functional separation 
prevents the spreading of 
failure effects from the 
failed redundancy to 
others.
Total defence Diversity and separation/segregation between redundant trains
Residual problem Common cause failures in diverse redundancies?
Solution: Functional diversity (= Defence in Depth)?tions and events can cause unforeseen software
states, transients or overload conditions that were
not covered by the initial requirements or by the
software design. Abnormal or failed states of hard-
ware and plant can cause software failure in a
channel or functional path. Where redundant
channels are used, an abnormal or failed state,
which appears on two or more channels, can cause
software CCF. Where two systems are used whose
functions are diverse, the abnormal or failed state
can appear in both functional paths and cause
software CCF.
A more comprehensive discussion about the
application of different diversity principles in pro-
grammable safety systems can be found e.g. in [9].
2.3.4 Defences for different failure types
In conclusion one can state that if it is not possible
to achieve the desired reliability concerning inher-
ent software faults in a single channel system (the
containment of hardware failures may still require
multiple redundant channels) some kind of diver-
sity is necessary. Independently developed (from
common functional specifications) computer-based
channels can improve the system reliability, but it
is hard to assess the achieved improvement. A bet-
ter assurance can be achieved either by using
functionally diverse computer-based channels or
having an analog back-up system for the compu-
ter-based channel(s). Use of analog back-ups, how-ever, divests much of the benefits of the transition
to computer-based system technology and should
be avoided as far as possible. Defences for differ-
ent failure types are summarised in Table I.
The common cause failure (CCF) propensity
(see Chapter 2.3.3) of the computer-based automa-
tion system applications is a central issue in
designing and implementing of safety critical au-
tomation functions of nuclear power plants. The
diversity principle is a commonly accepted design
strategy for solving this problem; the application
of different forms of diversity and the evaluation
of the achieved reliability, however, still poses
many open questions.
On the higher level the Finnish regulatory
system requires that:
“In ensuring the most important safety func-
tions, systems based on diverse principles of op-
eration shall be used to the extent possible
(395/1991, Guide YVL 1.0).”
In present day, non-passive plant designs this
means that even the automation functions partici-
pating in the realisation of these functions shall
have diversity; regardless of the selected technolo-
gy (electric, electronic or programmable electron-
ic).
On a single safety function level it is the
designers task to apply the above mentioned re-
dundancy, diversity and separation principles in15
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 2
Figure 4. Factors of the system dependability.
Dependability
Functionality Performance
Capacity,
timing,
etc.
Fault tolerance,
Fail safe properties,
etc.
Reliability
Environmental
durability
Absence of
design faultssuch a way that – among other things – the
reliability requirements set for the function (see
Chapter 2.4) are fulfilled. This is a typical design
optimisation task where design, implementation
and licensing costs are balanced in order to
achieve an acceptable safety level at minimal
costs.
In principle the designer has the following
three levels of diversity and various combinations
of these available in his design task; hardware,
software and functional diversity:
These can further be divided in sublevels:
• Hardware diversity
• different computers or processors
• different automation platforms
• analogue back-up systems
• Software diversity
• separate design teams
• random diversity
• enforced diversity
• different design and implementation tools
(compilers, linkers, loaders, operating sys-
tems etc.)
• Functional diversity
• division of the function into diverse sub-
functions with the same overall safety goal
The influence of these various diversity alterna-
tives was shortly discussed in Chapter 2.3.3. In
conclusion one can say that there so far is rather
limited experience on the effectiveness of various
diversity approaches and further research is still
needed.
2.4 Function and system requirements
The safe operation of a nuclear power plant re-
quires that the probability of accidents leading to
a large release of radioactivity is extremely low
[1]. That requirement means that the physical bar-
riers (fuel, cladding, primary pressure system and
the containment) preventing the release are kept
intact with a high probability. Present Finnish Nu-
clear power plant Guide YVL 2.8 sets goals for a
severe core accident (less than 10–5 /year) and for a
large release of radioactivity (less than 5·10–7 /
year) frequencies [2].
In present day – not entirely passive – plant
concepts the protection of the integrity of release
barriers requires certain highly dependable active
safety functions that can be started and carried16through when needed with high reliability. The
dependability of a safety system is composed of
the following factors shown in Figure 4.
• Firstly, the automatic safety system shall in-
clude proper functions needed for the detection
of anomalous plant process states and for the
starting of countermeasures for returning the
process back to a safe state and for mitigation
of the consequences of accident situations.
• Secondly, these functions shall have the re-
quired performance, that is, the ability to real-
ise the necessary functions correctly and effec-
tively. The performance can further be divided
in factors of capacity, fault tolerance and relia-
bility.
• Finally, the reliability is factored to the envi-
ronmental durability of the system hardware
and absence of design faults both in hardware
and software.
The task of the process design and deterministic
process safety analyses (transient and accident
analyses) is to define what automatic functions
are needed for the prevention of radioactive re-
leases during normal plant operation, anticipated
transients and postulated accident situations. De-
terministic analyses also define the necessary tim-
ing, capacity etc. performance requirements for
these functions.
Probabilistic process safety analyses, on the
other hand, define the necessary reliability re-
quirements for the safety functions in order to
fulfil the quantitative safety goals given in Guide
YVL 2.8.
These deterministic and probabilistic require-
ments for safety functions establish the input for
the automation engineering, whose task is to allo-
cate the requirement to systems and equipment so
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reliability) requirements will be satisfied with
high confidence. The progression of different de-
sign tasks is illustrated in Figure 5.
The essence of the safety case of a computer-
based safety critical automation function and as-
sociated system and equipment (FSE) is to demon-
strate with the satisfactorily high confidence that
the object of the case fulfils all requirements set
on it, including the fault tolerance, fail safe etc.
requirements. It is obvious, therefore, that com-
plete, clear and unambiguous requirement specifi-
cations are a necessity for the safety case.
2.5 SHIP-model of the safety case
The basic objective of the licensing process is to
collect evidence supporting the safety claims about
the automation system to be licensed, and based
on this evidence to assess, ideally numerically, the
achieved reliability or safety of the system. As sys-
tems become more complex, this becomes increas-
ingly difficult. Complexity increases the risks of
both random component failures and design-relat-
ed failures. Incorporating redundancy in the de-
sign can mitigate random hardware failures. De-
sign-related failures, such as software faults, can-
not be mitigated in the same way, as the design
fault would be common to redundant components,Figure 5. The progression of design tasks for safety
automation systems.
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affecting the safety of a complex system.
For some most safety critical automation sys-
tems in nuclear power plants quantitative relia-
bility targets are set by the licensing authority.
For random hardware failures there are well-
established techniques for quantifying their relia-
bility implications. The assessment of the impact
of design faults is more difficult. The main prob-
lem with this quantification is that we do not
know, in advance, the number and nature of the
design faults remaining in the system so it is
difficult to quantify their impact on reliability.
The estimation of the reliability of programma-
ble automation systems, possibly containing (soft-
ware) design faults, is then largely based on evi-
dence on quality of the design process. High quali-
ty design process:
• minimises the introduction of faults in the
system,
• detects and removes the faults during the de-
sign process, and
• uses proper means of tolerating the residual
faults.
This mostly qualitative evidence is then combined
during the licensing process with other evidence
about the system gained through tests, analyses
and operational experience.
The quality evidence about the design process
shall be raised in parallel with the proceeding the
process itself. It will evolve and become more
detailed and accurate when the system design
shapes up. At each stage, the basis of the safety
arguments should be clear and as stated by Bish-
op et. al. [10] they should:
• make an explicit set of claims about the sys-
tem,
• provide a systematic structure for marshalling
the evidence,
• provide a set of safety arguments that link the
claims to the evidence,
• make clear the assumptions and judgements
underlying the arguments and
• provide for different viewpoints and levels of
detail.
Using a model drafted in the assessment of the
Safety of Hazardous Industrial Processes in the
presence of design faults (SHIP) -project (financed17
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gramme, sub-theme: Major Industrial Hazards) a
safety case consists of the following elements [11]:
• claims about properties of the system or sub-
system
• evidence which is used as the basis of the
safety argument
• arguments linking the evidence to the claims
• inference rules that provide the logical basis
for the steps in an argument
The structure of the SHIP-model is summarised in
Figure 6. The evidence in the figure could in fact
be a sub-claim so the whole argument structure is
recursive, hiding the details in lower level argu-
ments. The evidence might also be initial design18
Figure 6. SHIP-model for the safety argumentation.
Evidence
Evidence
Evidence Claim
Inference rule
Inference rule
Argumentassumptions, which have to be supported by con-
firmatory tests as the development proceeds.
The actual nature of the argument and the
inference mechanism can vary depending on the
system design and the licensing process strategy.
For example, an argument could be:
• Deterministic, where the evidence can be axi-
oms, the inference mechanism is the rules of
predicate logic, and the safety argument is a
proof using those rules.
• Probabilistic, where the evidence could be com-
ponent failure rates and assumptions of inde-
pendence, and the inference mechanism is sta-
tistical analysis.
• Qualitative, where the evidence might be ad-
herence to standards, design rules, or guidance.
The inference mechanism is some form of ac-
ceptance criterion based on this.
In addition, the overall argument should be ro-
bust, i.e. the argument should be sound even if
there are uncertainties or errors in parts of the
argument. Also, it is evident that expert judge-
ment will have a significant role in the safety ar-
gumentation. To have a consistent way of imple-
menting the expert judgements to the safety argu-
mentation suitable assessment methods should be
developed. In the following chapters a method de-
veloped for taking an advantage of expert judge-
ments to utilise the SHIP-model is described.
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 2
3 Reliability modelling using
Bayesian networksThe practical reliability assessment method devel-
oped and applied in PASSI-project aims to support
the conceptual approach of SHIP-model presented
in the previous chapter. The general research ap-
proach has been to model and combine reliability
evidence of computer-based automation systems
using the framework of Bayesian modelling, and
in particular the technical solution of Bayesian
modelling called Bayesian networks.
The Bayesian modelling framework was chosen
as a basis of reliability assessment for different
reasons. First of all, Bayesian networks provide a
formal and consistent approach for modelling and
combining different kinds of evidence in a same
reliability analysis where the uncertainties in the
evidence can be expressed using the mathematical
framework of probability calculus. Second, in a
Bayesian model the reliability of a system is
explicitly stated so that basis of the reliability
estimation can easily and transparently be veri-
fied.
The principles of Bayesian modelling in the
reliability assessment of computer-based systems
are presented in a reliability modelling process
described below. The reliability modelling process
was tested in a case study on a quantitative
reliability estimation of a software-based motor
protection relay. The emphasis of the case study
was on the methodological analysis of the assess-
ment approach and summary of the case study is
given in the following chapter. Before going to the
reliability modelling and assessment of computer-
based systems in detail a general introduction to
the world of Bayesian modelling and Bayesian
networks is given.
3.1 Bayesian statistics and
interpretation of probability
Reliability is usually measured in terms of proba-
bility and, in general, statistical methods are usedto estimate these probabilities. Probability is an
abstract notion formulated as a measure theoretic
model for uncertainty. In a pure mathematical for-
mulation probability is an additive measure de-
fined in a measure space. The mathematical for-
mulation doesn’t say anything about the interpre-
tation of probability but only fixes the rules of
probability calculus. Different statistical frame-
works give different interpretation of probability
and these interpretations should be carefully con-
sidered when making inferences based on proba-
bilities of certain statistical framework.
The statistical framework most often exploited
in the probability estimation is based on the
frequentistic interpretation of probability, and the
frequentistic interpretation of probability is the
one most often introduced to students in the
elementary courses of statistics. The frequentistic
interpretation aims to an objective view of proba-
bility, which is defined as a long run frequency of
certain phenomena. Through the frequency defini-
tion probabilities in the frequentistic interpreta-
tion are considered as objective properties of natu-
ral phenomena, which do not depend on the ob-
server. The probabilities in the frequentistic inter-
pretation are estimated using the methods of
classical statistics.
Another interpretation of probability is the
subjective interpretation. In the subjective inter-
pretation of probability the probabilities are inter-
preted as degrees of beliefs on the occurrence of
certain events or truths of certain proposals. The
statistical approach adopted in the subjective in-
terpretation is the Bayesian statistics. In the
Bayesian statistics all unknown parameters of a
model are considered as random parameters and
the uncertainties of the unknown parameters are
expressed with prior probability distributions. The
structure and the parameters of the model are
modelled by their joint distribution and the statis-19
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carried out following the likelihood principle, i.e.
all information contained by a sample is described
by the likelihood function. Often Bayesian statis-
tics is described as predictive way of carrying out
statistical inference since the statistical inference
is applied on the observed information to predict
the future. More detailed introduction to the theo-
ry and use of Bayesian statistics in reliability
estimation of computer-based systems is given for
example in reports by Korhonen et al. [12] and
Helminen [13].
3.2 Bayesian modelling and
Bayesian (belief) networks
Bayesian modelling is a consistent formal model-
ling framework based on Bayesian statistics. With
Bayesian modelling the system can be divided un-
ambiguously into subparts or phases, which can
later be combined using the elegant theory of
Bayesian statistics. The term Bayesian in the mod-
elling framework is used to emphasise two partic-
ular characteristics. First, the term Bayesian re-
fers to a consistent use of Bayesian statistics and
to the subjective interpretation of probability as
described above. Second, the objective of the Baye-
sian modelling framework is to build a joint proba-
bility distribution for the system under study. The
model provides a comprehensive view of the whole
system under modelling not only a small subpart.
Of course, the modelling can be focused on a small-
er subpart or even a single parameter of the sys-
tem. The joint probability distribution is then used
to estimate the properties of the subpart or the
parameter.
Bayesian networks provide a graphical tool for
Bayesian modelling. Intuitively a Bayesian net-
work is a description of a Bayesian model, where a
collection of nodes is connected with directed arcs
forming a network. The network is a graphical
representation of the joint distribution of a model,
where the nodes represent the parameters and
the arcs describe the dependencies between the
parameters. Bayesian networks provide an easy
and flexible method for the modelling of complex
systems involving inexact information. The effi-
cient way to illustrate and form joint probability
distributions for a large set of variables along with
the increasing number of available Bayesian net-
work computer programs have increased the in-20terest toward Bayesian modelling. In the report
the application of Bayesian networks to the relia-
bility estimation of computer-based systems is
discussed. The Bayesian approach has also been
widely applied in other modelling applications and
to review for example the use of Bayesian net-
works in the research area of adaptive and intelli-
gent systems see a report by Myllymäki and Tirri
[14].
3.3 Bayesian networks in
reliability modelling
Traditionally, the reliability estimation of a com-
puter-based system has had strong reliance on the
evidence acquired from the system testing. To
demonstrate the achievement of strict reliability
goals set for example for the safety-critical appli-
cations of nuclear power plants the systems should
be well developed and built, and thoroughly test-
ed. With computer-based systems the difficulty is
that the number of possible tests even for a rela-
tively simple system may be enormous and full
testing of the computer-based system may not be
feasible. For safety-critical systems plausible relia-
bility estimations are, however, needed and one
proposal to overcome the difficulty is to compen-
sate the shortage of testing evidence with evidence
from other sources. The evidence, or potential
sources of evidence, in the reliability estimation of
computer-based systems were shortly reviewed in
Chapter 2.
While different evidence is used in the reliabili-
ty estimation of computer-based systems the com-
bination of evidence becomes an essential and
important part of the assessment. Different evi-
dence involves different characteristics, and to be
able to combine the pieces of evidence together
extra flexibility from the assessment methods is
required. The flexibility requirement favours the
use of Bayesian networks in the reliability estima-
tion. Bayesian networks provide a flexible, trans-
parent and consistent way of modelling and com-
bining different kind of evidence in a single relia-
bility assessment.
According to the SHIP-model presented in the
previous chapter the licensing process of safety-
critical systems can be seen as a process of setting
up safety claims on properties of a system and
then through analysing and combining evidence
the claims are argued. In similar manner the
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using Bayesian networks is carried out. First, the
collected evidence is analysed and formulated suit-
able for the Bayesian modelling framework. Sec-
ond, combining the different pieces of evidence
using Bayesian networks a statistical inference on
the reliability of a computer-based system is con-
cluded. The outcome of the process is a model
providing not only a reliability estimate, but also
an easy access to the evidence and to the beliefs
building up the estimate.
In practice, the evidence analysis and evidence
combination in the reliability modelling process
cannot be separated and the two parts are carried
out side by side. A general description of the
reliability modelling process using Bayesian net-
works in the reliability estimation of computer-
based systems is given below. In the description
the main phases of the modelling process are
illustrated and relevant inputs and outputs of the
Bayesian network model are explained. The main
phases of the modelling process are also present in
the case study of the following chapter.
3.4 Reliability modelling process
The purpose of a reliability modelling process is to
develop a concise model for the estimation of sys-Figure 7. Diagram representing the phases of reliability m
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? Variation oftem reliability. Generally, the reliability model and
the reliability estimate are used to support the
decision-making on the applicability of the system
for a certain purpose. The strong interrelationship
between the reliability estimation and the deci-
sion-making has an influence to the reliability
modelling process and to the reliability assess-
ment in general.
The general decision-making process is formu-
lated so that at the beginning of the process the
decision situation is outlined by identifying the
decision objectives and alternatives. Next, the de-
cision problem is decomposed and modelled. In the
model the problem structure, uncertainties and
preferences are determined. Based on the model
the best alternative for the decision problem is
chosen and sensitivity analysis for the alternative
is carried out. The final step is to evaluate wheth-
er further analysis is needed, and if not, then
implement the chosen alternative.
Partly inspired by the general decision-making
process the main phases of a structured modelling
process applied in the project for the reliability
estimation of computer-based systems are depict-
ed in Figure 7. The modelling process is composed
of three main phases: model structuring, model
application and sensitivity analysis. Along with21
odelling process.
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of the Bayesian networks are presented in the
diagram. In following, the different phases of the
modelling process are discussed in more detail.
3.4.1 Model structuring
In statistical inference the fundamental idea is to
use observed data to learn about the unknown
features of a system. The unknown features are
modelled in the form of random parameters. In
order to make inference on the parameters it is
essential to describe the links between the param-
eters and the data. Denoting the data by x and the
parameters by θ
θ
θ θ
θ
, the objective is to use x to learn
about . For example in the case study the failure
rate of different software versions of the motor
protection relay was the estimated parameter q,
and the amount of operation years and the
number and types of software defects encountered
for the different software versions were used as
data to carry out the estimation.
The inference between data and parameters is
usually carried out using a statistical model. The
statistical model is defined by stating the joint
distribution of data, model parameters and model
structure. The model structure, which determines
the links between data and model parameters, is
defined in the model through conditional probabil-
ities.
In Bayesian statistics, the joint distribution
p(x, ) is a product of a likelihood function p(x| )
and a prior distribution p( ). The use of prior
distribution in Bayesian inference is the main
source of disagreement between the two schools of
interpretation of probability described above. The
prior distribution formulates person’s prior belief
about the parameters, and therefore the natural
interpretation of probability in Bayesian statistics
is the subjective interpretation. In the case study
the prior distributions were formed for the failure
rate of the first software version and for the
reliability changes between successive software
versions.
The likelihood function is presented as a condi-
tional distribution of the observed variables given
the structure of the model and the other parame-
ters. Loosely speaking the likelihood function can
be described as the probability to observe the data
x. In the case study the likelihood was constructed
by using Poisson distribution for the number of
failures occurred in certain time interval.22In practise, the reliability modelling process
using Bayesian networks is usually carried out so
that a group of conditional probability distribu-
tions p(θi|θ1,…,θi–1,θi+1,…,θn) determining the in-
terrelations between the parameters are defined.
Combining the conditional probability distribu-
tions together the likelihood function is defined
and the model structure is fixed. The knowledge
for the model structuring is generally gathered
from the reliability theory, from different charac-
teristics of computer-based systems and their de-
velopment process. Also, previous experiences and
examples of similar reliability modelling processes
can provide valuable help for the model structur-
ing.
In the model-structuring phase it is important
to analyse the computer-based system and its
environment thoroughly and ground the claims
proposed in the model to the true characteristics
of the system using the valid rules of reliability
theory. The result of the model-structuring phase
is a Bayesian network setting a frame for the
reliability estimation. In the network definitions
for the parameters and for the dependencies be-
tween the parameters are explicitly stated.
3.4.2 Model application
In the application phase of the reliability model-
ling process the evidence on the reliability of com-
puter-based system is introduced to the model. As
described above, the model variables were divided
to data and unknown parameters. In practice, the
division is not so self-evident and it is more con-
venient to consider all variables of the model as
unknown parameters. Actually, in Bayesian statis-
tics all parameters are considered as random vari-
ables where the observed parameters become
fixed. The parameters can therefore be grouped as
observable parameters and so-called hidden or
auxiliary parameters, which cannot be valued or
observed directly. Evidence of the observable pa-
rameters is implemented to the model as data to
carry out inference on the hidden parameters.
The hidden parameters may represent physical
quantities that for some reason cannot be ob-
served or they may be abstractions of the reality
that can only be measured in conceptual level.
Estimated failure rate in the case study is a good
example of a hidden parameter of the second kind.
Reliability of a system can be measured in differ-
ent ways depending on the system and the circum-
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per time unit, is often used. Failure rate cannot be
measured in same sense as for example the physi-
cal quantities of temperature or pressure. Howev-
er, estimates for the failure rate can be evaluated
by making an inference based on the observable
parameters of a system such as number of failures
and time of operation of the system.
Due to the special characteristic of the hidden
parameters their evidence is usually sparse or the
interpretation and implementation of the evidence
to the model is ambiguous. In Bayesian networks
the hidden parameters are given prior estimations
presenting subjective judgements on the values of
the parameters. In the reliability estimation of
computer-based systems the prior estimations are
normally formed in some sort of expert judgement
process using evidence from the development proc-
ess and the design features of the system. The
uncertainties about the values of the hidden pa-
rameters are modelled by probability distribu-
tions.
Building the prior distributions of the model
parameters is an important part of the model
application phase. Since the prior estimations are
subjective beliefs on the values of the parameter
before the observation of the data, it is inevitable
that different people will have different beliefs
and will come to different conclusions about the
prior distributions. To avoid prejudice and arbi-
trariness it is important to make the assessment
of the prior distributions as transparent as possi-
ble. The prior belief should be formulated so that
they can be defended to other people as being
based on genuine knowledge. In the case study the
building of the prior reliability distribution was
based on an expert judgement process described
in the following chapter.
After the prior distributions for the hidden
parameters are estimated, data for the computer-
based system can be collected and implemented to
the model. Data provides additional information
about the hidden parameters, and the prior esti-
mates are updated using the Bayes’ rule. The
updated distributions are called posterior distri-
butions, and they are the conditional distributions
of the hidden parameters given the evidence. The
posterior distributions describe the uncertainty
about the hidden parameters when the informa-
tion from the observed parameters is taken into
account.The result of the model application phase is the
joint distribution of the reliability model, from
which the posterior distributions of the hidden
parameters can be integrated. For example in the
case study the posterior distributions under inter-
est were the probability distributions of the failure
rates of the different software versions produced
in the life cycle of the motor protection relay. In
relatively simple networks the calculations can be
carried out using conventional numerical tech-
niques, but for networks containing tens and hun-
dreds of parameters the calculation must be car-
ried out using Monte Carlo Markov Chain meth-
ods. Fortunately, nowadays there are many com-
mercial and non-commercial computer programs
available for the modelling and calculation of
Bayesian networks.
3.4.3 Sensitivity analysis
The final phase of the reliability modelling is the
sensitivity analysis phase. The purpose of sensitiv-
ity analysis is to determine how sensitive the reli-
ability model is to the assumption made in the
evidence and model building. Despite the impor-
tance of the sensitivity analysis the limited re-
sources of the modelling process may sometimes
cause a temptation to leave the phase for a small
consideration only. This would be a major draw-
back since the purpose of the sensitivity analysis
phase is not only to investigate how sensitive the
results are to the assumptions but also to make
judgements about the rationality of the results
and the reliability model in general.
Typical subjects of sensitivity analysis in Baye-
sian networks are the prior distributions of the
system parameters and the likelihood function, i.e.
the dependencies between the model parameters.
For prior distributions the sensitivity analysis is
straightforward and can easily be carried out by
calculating the posterior distributions using dif-
ferent prior distributions. For likelihood functions
the analysis a bit harder since it usually requires
changes in the structure of the Bayesian network.
Sometimes it is necessary to carry out a sensitivi-
ty analysis to the data as well. For example in the
case study the interpretation of data on the soft-
ware defects wasn’t unanimous, and therefore it
was reasonable to carry out the calculations using
two different data sets to see if the different
interpretations had an influence to the final re-
sults.23
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posterior distributions and the reliability model
are evaluated so that the uncertainties of the
assessment are recognized and their influences to
the results can be estimated. The consistent use of
probability distributions in the reliability model-
ling process is a major benefit for the sensitivity
analysis phase. Adjusting the variance of the prob-
ability distributions of the model parameters the
uncertainty of the parameters can easily be modi-
fied. Careful execution of the sensitivity analysis
phase gives support for the decision-making
whether the evidence and reliability model is
sufficient and no further analysis is needed.
3.5 Elicitation and summarisation
When making a statistical analysis of any kind, it
is usually not the statistician who is directly inter-
ested in the results. Most often, the analysis is
performed for a client who is somehow involved or
interested in the results. In Bayesian modelling
process the results are given in the posterior dis-
tributions. In fact, the posterior distributions con-
tain all the information known about the hidden
parameters θ at the moment. However, this is not
always very helpful. The information is encapsu-
lated in the mathematical formula, and meaning-
ful summaries of the posterior distributions should
be prepared. These summaries include means,
modes or medians, variances and any other de-
scriptive statistics that will help the client to see
what is known about θ.24
Figure 8. Representation of general reliability assessment
originates from the lecture notes of O’Hagan [15].
Prior
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Posterior
summaries 
Elicitation 
Summarisatio
Domain of client Just like summaries can be used as a natural
way of expressing posterior information, summa-
ries can also be used in the forming of prior
distributions. In fact, the reliability modelling
process presented above can be extended to a
general reliability assessment process using Baye-
sian networks. The general assessment process is
illustrated in Figure 8. The description of the
reliability modelling process concludes the right
hand side of the reliability assessment process. In
the assessment process the reliability evidence is
first collected to prior summaries. The prior sum-
maries form the basis of elicitation to build up the
prior distributions of the hidden parameters of a
Bayesian model. After the prior distributions are
determined, Bayes’ rule is applied to update the
prior distributions to posterior distributions. Fi-
nally, the relevant information of the posterior
distributions is summarised to the client in the
posterior summaries.
In the assessment process the left hand side
represents the domain of the client, while the
right hand side is the domain of the statistician.
Summaries are the natural language to elicit the
client’s prior information to the statistician, and
on the other hand to summarise the posterior
information back to the client. The arrows in the
figure represent the statistician’s tasks in the
assessment process. The case study in the follow-
ing chapter is a practical example of a reliability
assessment process described in Figure 8. process using Bayesian networks. Representation
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4 Case study on reliability estimation of a
computer-based motor protection relayTo test the reliability assessment approach in
practice a case study on a quantitative reliability
estimation of a software-based motor protection
relay was carried out in the project. The frame-
work of Bayesian modelling and Bayesian net-
works was applied throughout the assessment.
The emphasis of the assessment was on the meth-
odological analysis of the assessment method, and
the case study system and the evidence were re-
viewed only on a level necessary to test the func-
tionality of the assessment method.
The parameter under estimation in the assess-
ment was the failure rate of different software
versions of the motor protection relay. Both quan-
titative and qualitative evidence were used to
carry out an inference on the failure rate. The
evidence was provided by the system manufactur-
er and prior summaries in the assessment were
gathered in co-operation with the system develop-
ers using an expert judgement process described
later on. Posterior summaries of the assessment
are concluded in the graphs presenting in the end
of the chapter. The presentation of the case study
is a summary of a longer report and for more
detailed description of the assessment and the
numerical values used in the estimation see the
report by Helminen & Pulkkinen [16].
The general structure of the summary recalls
the main phases of the reliability modelling proc-
ess introduced in Chapter 3. The summary starts
with an explanation of the target system and the
assessment process. Next, the structure of the
reliability model is described. After the description
of the model a detailed introduction to the evi-
dence and to the application of the reliability
model is given. Review on the sensitivity analysis
and the results are given in the end of the chapter.4.1 Target system and
assessment process
The case study system under estimation was an
integrated design of current measuring multifunc-
tional relay for the complete protection of alter-
nating current motors. The relay continuously
measures the three phase currents and the residu-
al current of the protected object. When a fault
occurs and persists long enough to exceed a set or
calculated occurrence time, the relay starts and
operates. Depending on the relay setting and the
fault the relay either gives an alarm or launches a
protection signal to protect the object.
At the time of the assessment the case study
system had not been applied in safety critical
functions of nuclear power plants and explicit
consideration if the relay fulfils all the aspects of a
safety critical system of a nuclear power plant was
not carried out in the assessment. However, the
motor protection relay is a computer-based appli-
cation for which high reliability is required, and
therefore it was an excellent case study system for
the assessment.
The idea in the assessment process was to
combine the available evidence to form an as
plausible reliability estimation of the target sys-
tem as possible. In the assessment the whole life
cycle of the software-based system was taken into
consideration and a diagram representing the
elements of assessment process is depicted in
Figure 9.
In the beginning of the assessment a prior
reliability estimation for the first software version
of the relay was built. The prior estimation was
based on the expert judgements on the product
development process and it was constructed in an
expert judgement process. The prior estimation25
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ence of the first software version. Later on, when
the software was modified, the effects of the modi-
fications to the software reliability were evaluated
using expert judgement on the version manage-
ment and the estimation was updated with the
operational experience of the second software ver-
sion. This procedure was repeated, as many times
as there were new software versions produced in
the life cycle of the system.
4.2 Structure of reliability model
The reliability model was mainly based on the
characteristics of the available evidence in the as-
sessment. The operational experience consisted of
the approximated amount of working years and
the amount and types of software defects encoun-
tered for the different software versions of the sys-
tem. Therefore, the appropriate conditional distri-
bution of the number of software faults of a soft-
ware version given the failure rate and operating
years was considered Poisson distributed as fol-
lows:
( ), ~f x T Poisson T ,( )λ λ (Eq. 1)
where x is the number of software faults, l failure
rate and T estimated total operating years of a
software version. For more detailed introduction
of Poisson processes in the reliability estimation of
computer-based systems see for example book by
Musa et al. [17].
The prior distribution for the failure rate of the
first software version given by the experts was a
mixture of lognormal distributions. In order to
simplify the numerical computation in the assess-26
Figure 9. Diagram representing the software (SW) reliabili
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The failure rate of a software version in the
model is constant, although unknown. However,
the failure rate changes when shifting to the
following software version. The change in failure
rate is expressed in terms of log-transformed pa-
rameters as follows:
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where θi and θi+1 are the log-transformed failure
rates of successive software versions and w is the
random normal distributed change. Parameters µi
and σi2 correspond to the prior knowledge about
the failure rate change, and were determined
based on the expert judgement of the assessment
executives.
4.3 Application of reliability model
The evidence in the assessment was based on two
primary sources. The first source of evidence was
the expert judgements of the system developers
and assessment executives. The second source was
the operational experience of the computer-based
system. In the assessment the development proc-
ess and version management of the system was
reviewed by the experts and based on their judge-
ments a prior failure rate distribution of the first
software version and prior estimates of the relia-
bility changes between the successive software
versions were concluded. In the construction of
the prior failure rate distribution a specific expert
judgement process was carried out.ty assessment process.
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The prior failure rate distribution of the first soft-
ware version was built using the expert judge-
ments of the product development personnel, such
as project managers, designers and programmers
of the system. The prior estimation was construct-
ed in an expert judgement process. A diagram rep-Figure 10. Diagram presenting the six steps of the expert 
probability of software.
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In practice the expert judgement process was
carried out using a collection of interviews. The
purpose of the interviews was to recall the memo-
ries of the system development process. The ques-
tions of the interviews were divided to five catego-27
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a normal computer-based system. The categories
were: project control and quality, requirement
specification phase, design phase, implementation
phase and testing phase. Before the interviews the
experts received a short period of training on the
assessment process and how to give probability
estimations based on expert judgement overall.
The training session was given to all experts
simultaneously, but the interviews were carried
out individually.
In the first two steps of the expert judgement
process the different phases of the software devel-
opment process were discussed. Based on the
previous experience and the conclusions of the
interviews the experts gave score values and
weights for the different software development
phases. The score values and weights were numer-
ical values between zero and ten reflecting the
expert’s opinion on how well the production team
managed in the execution of a phase and how big
of importance did a certain phase have to the total
reliability of the system. In the training session
the numerical scale used in the assessment and
the meaning of different score values were dis-
cussed from the system reliability point of view,
and this way each expert was able to build an
interpretation of his own about the meaning of the
score values. In the third step the values given in
the previous two steps were united to a total score
value using an additive value function.
In addition to the score values and weights the
experts were asked to give failure rate distribu-
tions for two or three different score values in step
four. The system failure rate distributions should
represent expert’s opinion of score values as well
as possible, since these distributions were used to
calibrate the scale of score values. After the cali-
bration it was possible to extrapolate a failure rate
distribution for other score values in the scale. The
conversion from the total score value to corre-
sponding failure rate distribution was carried out
in step five. In the final sixth step of the expert
judgement process the reliability estimates or fail-
ure rate distributions of all experts were combined
together to form the prior failure rate distribution
of the first software version of the target system.
Detailed presentation of the numerical values
derived in the expert judgement process is given
in report by Helminen & Pulkkinen [16].284.3.2 Reliability changes
between software versions
In case there are several software versions pro-
duced during the life cycle of a computer-based
system it is important to be able to use the evi-
dence from previous software versions for the reli-
ability estimation of the last software version. This
is especially important if the operational experi-
ence for the last software version is small. Howev-
er, to be consistent in the estimation the reliability
changes between successive software versions
need to be evaluated.
In the assessment the effects of the software
modifications between successive software ver-
sions and the criticality of the modifications to the
system reliability were evaluated in co-operation
between the system developers and the assess-
ment executives. The reliability changes between
successive software versions were modelled so
that the reliability estimate of a software version
was the same as the reliability estimate of the
preceding software version added with a normal
distributed random change (see Equation 2). A
prior estimate on the magnitude of the change
was determined depending on the amount and
criticality of changes made between software ver-
sions.
4.3.3 Operational experience
The second main evidence source in the assess-
ment was the operational experience estimated
during the life cycle of the software-based system.
The operational experience was the approximated
amount of operating years and the amount and
types of software defects encountered for the dif-
ferent software versions of the system. The soft-
ware defects were classified to software faults and
software inconveniences depending on the severi-
ty of a defect from the customer’s point of view.
The faults and inconveniences were reported ei-
ther by the developer or the customers. After de-
tection, a defect was analysed and depending on
the nature of the defect it was corrected in the
next software version.
As well known, the reliability of a computer-
based system is a factor of two properties. First of
all, it is a property of the faults the system may
contain. However, even though there may be faults
in the software these faults are only revealed
when certain inputs are introduced to the system.
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 2The probability distribution of input sequences
introduced to the system varies from one opera-
tional profile to another. The reliability of a com-
puter-based system is, therefore, a property of the
system faults and the operation profile the system
is functioning in. To simplify the modelling and
the calculations in the assessment it was assumed
that the estimated operational experience for dif-
ferent software versions was obtained from a sin-
gle and similar operational profile.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis and results
In the assessment sensitivity analyses concerning
two different subjects were carried out. In the first
sensitivity analysis the influence of the prior relia-
bility changes between software versions was eval-
uated. In the second analysis the significance of
the interpretation of the software defects to the
results was determined. Due to the different sensi-
tivity analyses there are four different scenarios of
the final results.
In the sensitivity analysis of reliability changes
two different approaches on the influence of soft-
ware changes were taken. Calculations were car-
ried out using a neutral and a conservative ap-
proach. In the neutral approach the prior mean
value of the change term between successive soft-
ware versions was assumed zero. In the conserva-
tive approach it was assumed as a prior assump-
tion that a change in software has a negative
influence to the reliability of the system. What
this means is that as a fault is removed from the
software new faults are always introduced to the
software. To evaluate the influence of different
interpretations of software defects to the results
two different data sets were used. In the first data
set only the number of software faults encoun-
tered for different software versions were imple-
mented to the model as fault data. In the second
data set both the software faults and the software
inconveniences were taken into count.
In the life cycle of the motor protection relay
there had been seven different software versions.
The software versions are labelled from A to G asshown in Figure 9. Calculated posterior failure
rate distributions for different software versions
using the conservative approach are presented in
Figure 11. The posterior failure rate distributions
range from 2.5 percentile, the lower bar, to 97.5
percentile, the upper bar, and median marked as a
dot somewhere in between. Corresponding graphs
for the neutral approach are shown in Figure 12.
From the graphs it can be seen how the confi-
dence on the reliability of the motor protection
relay is increased while the defects are removed
and the system software is updated. For example
from Figure 11 it can be approximated that the
median value of software version A implies that
two times out of thousand, a device will encounter
a software fault during a year of operation. For
software version G the corresponding median val-
ue is four times out of one hundred thousand. In
the calculations all the devices were assumed to
function in a similar operational profile.
Significant differences between the posterior
failure rate distributions of the two approaches
used for the influence of software changes cannot
be noticed. With the conservative approach the
failure rate distributions of different software ver-
sions seem to be more monotonous, i.e. the esti-
mates for the early software versions are better
than in the neutral approach and vice versa for
the later software versions. However, the differ-
ence between the two approaches for the failure
rate of the last and crucial software version is
negligible as can be verified from the figures.
Explanation to the small difference in the last
software version can most probably be found from
the large amount of operational experience data,
and thereby the dominant role of the operational
experience in the assessment.
In general, the posterior failure rate distribu-
tions of the software versions provide an informa-
tive way to follow up the evolution of reliability
trend during the life cycle of the computer-based
system. From the figures of the assessment it is
easy to estimate when the system has reached a
maturity required by a certain application.29
30
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Figure 11. Posterior 2,5–50–97,5 percentiles for failure rate distributions of different software versions of the
conservative approach.
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Figure 12. Posterior 2,5–50–97,5 percentiles for failure rate distributions of different software versions of the
neutral approach.
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5 Discussion5.1 Quantitative reliability assessment
in safety case
As already stated above a safety related system
must have a safety case, which provides a body of
evidence that the system is adequately safe for a
given application and environment over its life-
time. The safety case should include an assess-
ment of the functionality, performance and relia-
bility of the system. The safety demonstration of
computer-based systems is a challenging task and
methods for this purpose have been developed
worldwide. However, approaches for quantitative
reliability analysis of computer-based systems are
still in a phase of early development. PASSI-
project approached the reliability analysis by ap-
plying Bayesian networks.
Conventional quantitative reliability assess-
ment aims at determining an estimate for a fail-
ure probability of a system. In principle, the relia-
bility of computer-based systems can be seen anal-
ogous to that of mechanical systems. It is fully
meaningful to ask for a probability that a compu-
ter-based system does not operate as specified in
certain situations. This becomes evident for exam-
ple in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), where
the failure probabilities for safety functions are
needed independently on the technology by which
the functions are realised.
The probabilistic interpretation of reliability,
i.e. the uncertainty concerning the occurrence of
failures expressed in probabilistic concepts, is a
rational approach in reliability and risk assess-
ments. For example in PSA the failure probability
of a safety function is estimated by developing a
fault tree model, determining the probabilities of
the basic events (i.e. the component failures), and
calculating the final failure probability estimate
using the rules of probability calculus.
However, the construction of the fault tree for a
computer-based safety function may be a problem-atic task due to many reasons. First, a computer-
ised system is often designed to perform several
safety functions. PSA requires failure probabilities
for each of these functions. In computerised safety
systems, these single safety functions use the
resources of the platform and they thus are not
fully independent. The evidence collected from the
design life-cycle of the application and platform
refer mainly to the whole of the system, not to the
single safety functions. The same is true for opera-
tional experience.
Secondly, PSA requires probability that a safe-
ty function does not operate correctly when de-
manded. In principle, the demand situations are
defined in the requirements specification of the
system. However, the concept of demand is prob-
lematic here: it is not always clear whether the
evidence (operating experience or evidence from
design features and design process) really corre-
spond exactly the demand situation. Another pos-
sibility is that the erroneous operation of a safety
function causes an initiating event. In that case
one has to identify such erroneous operation
modes, which can cause an initiating event. The
requirement specifications are connected to this
by defining the fail-safe states of the system. In
PSA, these failure events are quantified by deter-
mining the failure rate or intensity. Again, it is not
always clear how the available evidence corre-
sponds to the quantifiable entity.
In the case study described above, an estimate
of a failure rate of a single programmable compo-
nent was determined by using a Bayesian model.
A failure of such component is usually a basic
event in a fault-tree model of larger safety system
or function. The Bayesian network approach yields
a reliability estimate, which can be used in a fault
tree model for a single component. To develop a
reliability estimate for an automation system with
several safety function requires, however, much31
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basis of the case study may not be relevant for the
analysis of such systems.
The assessment discussed in this report follows
the conceptual approach of SHIP-model providing
solid ground for the reliability argumentation of
computer-based systems. In a Bayesian model the
reliability claims of a system are rationally con-
structed and the arguments the claims are based
on are clearly stated. Assessment method can
thereby be used as a tool of gathering a safety case
for a system and as a communicative instrument
in a licensing process of computer-based automa-
tion systems.
5.2 Analysis of evidence by
Bayesian networks
One basic idea of Bayesian network model is to
describe the evidence and the relationships be-
tween various pieces of evidence in the form of
probability statements. In principle, each assump-
tion concerning or presenting an evaluation of sys-
tems properties should correspond a node (i.e. a
random variable) in the Bayesian network model.
Thus, in an ideal case, the structure of a Bayesian
network should correspond the form of the totality
of evidence and assumptions about the system un-
der analysis.
Objective of the case study was on the method-
ological development of the assessment method,
therefore, the evidence on the systems technical
features and on the design process were not well
structured. Due to this, the evidence on these
features were elicited and quantified by expert
judgement, and presented as a prior distribution
of the failure rate. The structure of the evidence
was not described by a network of random varia-
bles but as a single probability distribution. This
was a feasible modelling decision corresponding
conceptually the evidence that was available.
The model of the case study included a descrip-
tion of the operating experience from successive
versions of the system under analysis. An impor-
tant assumption made here was that the opera-
tional profiles of each system version were similar.
This assumption was thought to be certainly true,
in order to simplify the model (although it is fully
possible to describe uncertainty of this assumption
by suitable random variables). Another assump-
tion was that the failure rate of a version of the32system depends in a simple way on that of the
preceding version. However, this dependence was
assumed stochastic, and its strength could be
controlled by certain variables. In the extreme
case, the failure rates of successive versions could
be made independent, which means that the evi-
dence from earlier versions has no impact on the
failure rate of next versions. This means also that
the prior evidence (described by the prior distribu-
tion) has no impact. In fact this kind of extreme
assumption is most conservative: it means that
there is no prior evidence, and that the uncertain-
ty is in this sense maximal. The aim of the case
study was not to analyse of the truth of these
assumptions but to demonstrate the possibilities
of Bayesian network methodology to deal with
such assumptions.
In a parallel project, which was carried out as a
shared cost EU-project (BE-SECBS, see e.g. [18]),
some steps of the method were applied to a set of
programmed safety functions. The analysis cov-
ered an evaluation of the evidence provided by the
system vendor and the construction of a Bayesian
network model. However, the reliability of the
safety functions was not estimated on the project.
The Bayesian network followed the structure of
the life-cycle of the system under analysis. The
application life-cycle steps included into the model
were requirement specification, concept design,
detailed design, application C-code generation,
simulation tests, code compilation and linking and
integrated system tests. The variables of the net-
work were some kind of quality ratings of the life-
cycle step products and corresponding develop-
ment processes. Both the construction of the net-
work structure and the quantification of the quali-
ty rating were carried out as an expert judgement
process. The quantification consisted on develop-
ing quality ratings for the process of above men-
tioned life-cycle steps and the quality evaluation
of the results of these steps. The evaluation was
made in terms of probability distributions. Howev-
er, the reliability of the safety functions was not
evaluated quantitatively. Thus, the main experi-
ence gained from this project was the qualitative
analysis of evidence from the development life-
cycle and the development of the Bayesian net-
work structure. Although the use of the develop-
ment life-cycle as the structural basis for the
Bayesian network seems a natural approach, there
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titative measurement of the life-cycle process
seems possible, but it is not straightforward to
identify the relationship between the measure-
ments and the reliability estimates. The evidence
concerning system structure (or the result of an
life-cycle step) is more difficult to be included into
the Bayesian network model: it is not easy to
describe this in the form of random variables,
which are needed in Bayesian network. Similarly,
the results of analyses (e.g. FMEA, formal analy-
ses of the code correctness, etc) are not easily
described as the nodes of Bayesian network.
It seems that the quantitative reliability analy-
sis of programmable systems remains an expert
judgement problem. Although operational experi-
ence may be available, the relevance of this statis-
tical evidence should be evaluated by an expert
team, as noticed in the case study. Similarly, the
more or less qualitative evidence about the system
itself and from the systems development life-cycle,
should be modelled and quantified in an expert
judgement process. In this phase of the research,
there are no well-established principles to build a
Bayesian network model corresponding to this
qualitative evidence. The development of such
principles requires, at least to some extent, the
formal analysis of semantic and logical properties
of the evidence, for example along the thoughts
discussed by Courtois [19].
In practical cases, Bayesian networks could be
constructed to follow the systems development
life-cycle models, i.e. the phases of the life-cycle
models could be described by suitable random
variables. The dependencies between consecutive
life-cycle phases could be explicitly described in a
model. The analysis of logical structure of the
evidence could support also this task. However,
this would call for extra understanding of the
system from the modeller, which usually hasn’t be
directly involved in the development of the sys-
tem. One way to overcome the difficulty is to
enhance the communication between the reliabili-
ty modellers and the experts involved with the
development process of the assessed systems.
In the case study a special expert judgement
process was carried out for the quantification of
the prior reliability estimation of the first software
version. The expert judgement process was ap-
plied in rather informal way giving the expertopinions lots of influence. Other possibility would
have been to use independent assessors. Use of
independent assessors would probably have set
the documentation of development process and
system features in more central role in the prior
estimation. However, in the results it was conclud-
ed that the significance of the prior estimation
had only little influence to the final results be-
cause of the dominant role of the operational
experience. The results provide a good example of
the benefits of using Bayesian networks in the
reliability estimation of computer-based systems.
In the assessment different pieces of evidence can
be compared and their significance to the final
results can be estimated.
In spite of the difficulties discussed above,
Bayesian networks provide a promising way of
finding plausible quantitative reliability estimates
of computer-based systems. In an estimate proper-
ties and failure behaviours of a system are ana-
lysed in an efficient and transparent way. Differ-
ent pieces of evidence are combined and statistical
inference on the evidence is concluded using the
consistent framework of Bayesian modelling theo-
ry. In the reliability assessment all uncertainties
and assumptions are expressed in the form of
probability statements and Bayesian interpreta-
tion of probability is applied throughout the mod-
el. Bayesian network is a model incorporating and
combining the various pieces of evidence as a well-
defined probability model. Results of the model
are presented as informative posterior distribu-
tions on parameters of interest.
5.3 Topics for further research
The PASSI-project has covered several research
topics in the field of nuclear power plant automa-
tion. Such issues as ageing of automation systems,
FMEA [20] and reliability analysis of programma-
ble automation systems have been covered. This
report deals mainly with the reliability analysis
and its role in licensing of the automation system.
The licensing process of automation system is
complex and includes several different approaches
and analyses. The methodology for these analyses
is still developing, and there is lot of needs for
further research. Some issues for further research
in the area of reliability analysis are discussed
here.
The Bayesian network approach applied and33
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of computer-based safety systems is still rather far
from being established method. It has been ap-
plied only in rather limited cases, which do not
correspond the real practical situation. New real
life applications are needed. Case studies concern-
ing both single programmed devices and whole
programmed safety functions are needed. To sup-
port the real life licensing process the studies
should concentrate on the most demanding appli-
cations on the highest safety class levels. The
evidence to be modelled and analysed should be
rich enough: data from both operating experience
and design features and processes should be cov-
ered.
Only the case studies can demonstrate the
feasibility and applicability of the approach, and
only through them it is possible to develop practi-
cal expert judgement techniques needed. However,
the reliability analysis is not a pure expert judge-
ment process. In order to reach a practical reliabil-
ity analysis tool, the experiences and techniques of
formal evidence analyses (see [19]) must be com-34bined with the Bayesian network modelling. The
logical structure of the safety case should be taken
into account in order to analyse the relevance of
the evidence. In fact, the Bayesian network struc-
ture should be compatible with the formal struc-
ture of the safety case. A lot of research work is
needed to solve this task.
The licensing process usually includes use of
computerised code analysis and requirement anal-
ysis tools. The results of this type of analyses form
an important and useful body of evidence, which
has not been covered in the PASSI-project. This is
a weakness, which should be taken into account in
future research. Also tools and techniques for
requirement management are needed.
The role of quantitative reliability assessment
is evident in licensing of computer-based systems.
It seems that the expert judgements and subjec-
tive probability statements and evaluations will
be inevitable. This implies that the interpretation
and use of these analyses should be clarified and
practises for real risk-informed licensing princi-
ples should be demonstrated.
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